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Entering the Empire
I. The Bandung Conference
Discussions of postcolonial history routinely 
emphasise Bandung as the seminal moment 
in the political formation of postcoloniality. 
Organised by Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Pakistan and the 
Philippines, the April 1955 conference in 
Indonesia was attended by the leaders of 
twenty-nine formerly colonised, newly 
independent nations of Asia and Africa, 
most notably Ahmed Sukarno, President of 
Indonesia, Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister 
of India, Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of 
Egypt, Zhou Enlai, Premier of China, and Ho 
Chi Minh, Prime Minister of North Vietnam. 
Also in attendance was Kwame Nkrumah, 
Prime Minister of the Gold Coast (Ghana), 
which in 1957 was to become the first sub-
Saharan colony to gain independence. For the 
first time they came together not as activists 
and leaders of anti-colonial movements, but 
as politicians in power. The countries repre-
sented at Bandung included almost all of 
Asia and independent Africa.1 China was 
invited (at Nehru’s suggestion), but North 
and South Korea, South Africa and Israel 
were not. The conference was also attended 
by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of 
Harlem, New York, and the novelist Richard 
Wright, who went as observers and whose 
presence helped to consolidate identifica-
tions between African-Americans and Third 
World nations.2
Bandung is generally associated with the 
formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, a 
bold assertion of a third force within world 
affairs outside the respective orbits of the 
Western and Soviet blocs, in which the 
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newly decolonised nations sought to establish an international political, economic and ideologi-
cal identity, distinct from those of the capitalist West and the communist East. After hundreds 
of years of colonisation and domination by foreign powers, now that they had freed themselves 
from Western imperialism, most of the participants at Bandung had no desire to line up behind 
a new master and sign up with the Soviets. As Nehru put it forcefully:
Has it come to this, that the leaders of thought who have given religions and all kinds of things 
to the world have to tag on to this kind of group or that and be hangers-on of this party or 
the other carrying out their wishes and occasionally giving an idea? It is most degrading and 
humiliating to any self-respecting people or nation. It is an intolerable thought to me that the 
great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade 
themselves or humiliate themselves in this way.3
What the Bandung nations wanted was to live free from the control or intervention of either of the 
world’s superpowers. The idea of belonging to a third group, which aligned itself independently, 
was an intoxicating one. However desirable it may have been, however, things were not to prove 
so simple.
To credit Bandung with the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement is true in spirit, though not 
in fact. The Non-Aligned Movement was not actually formally initiated until 1961 in Belgrade. 
The Prime Minister of Iraq, Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, one of the signatories to the UN Charter, 
proposed to the Bandung delegates the idea of the formation of a third bloc composed of the 
smaller nations in order to give them the protection they needed from the predatory power of 
the Western and Eastern blocs.4 Nehru, however, flatly rejected the idea, suggesting that they 
were better protected by staying separate. At the same time, it had been Nehru himself who had 
proposed the general strategy of non-alignment:
So far as I am concerned, it does not matter what war takes place; we will not take part in it 
unless we have to defend ourselves. If I join any of these big groups I lose my identity … If all 
the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The 
inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes place in reducing that area in 
the world which may be called the unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war.5 
As Nehru’s remarks indicate, the politics of independence was seen very much in terms of the 
dynamics of the Cold War and the immanent prospect of a global conflict between East and West. 
While seeking to establish some form of Asian and African solidarity and mutual cooperation, 
therefore, the conference was in fact dominated by the primary concern of maintaining peace and 
independence during the Cold War. Many speakers noted that what all twenty-nine countries had 
in common was the experience of colonialism. They were therefore supportive of current anti-
colonial struggles in countries still under colonial rule. Expressions of support, however, were 
relatively muted, and confined to statements about French North Africa (with very little reference 
to Algeria), Palestine, and problems of particular delegates, such as the Yemen’s preoccupation 
with Aden. Anti-colonialism was overshadowed by a strong sense of the recent or impending 
dangers for vulnerable new nations, and the perceived threat to peace of Great Power rivalry. 
With memories of the Korean War of 1950–53 still recent, ongoing wars between communist 
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and government forces in Laos and Malaya, and dangerous tensions between China and the 
USA over the latter’s support for Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, much of the discussion was taken 
up with the question of how Asian countries could avoid being caught up in the hot battles of the 
Cold War. It was already obvious to participants that the Cold War was being largely played out 
through rivalries staged in the colonial and decolonised arenas. 
To counter this situation, many leaders, from Sukarno to Nasser, spoke of their desire to assert 
an Asian-African voice as a moral force for peace, hoping that, as Anwar Sadat put it two years 
later, Africa and Asia would become a vast region of tranquillity. In his welcoming address, 
Sukarno spoke of mobilising “the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace”, while Nehru 
remarked that the 
Honorable Members laid great stress on moral force. It is with military force that we are dealing 
now, but I submit that moral force counts and the moral force of Asia and Africa must, in spite 
of the atomic and hydrogen bombs of Russia, the U.S.A. or another country, count …6
Such an emphasis on the exertion of moral force fitted in very nicely with the general affirmation 
of the Gandhian method of anti-colonial struggle through non-violence and positive action which 
many of the delegates espoused. The recent experience of wars in Asia gave renewed urgency 
to the doctrine of non-violent moral force, though it was to be some time before this encouraged 
the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement at Belgrade in 1961. The whole emphasis of such a 
movement was on a non-aligned negative identity, which went along with a politics of neutrality. 
Differences between an ever-increasing number of member countries (by 2003 there were 112 
members) meant that non-alignment was never transformed into a positive, separate politi-
cal identity. The movement never really countenanced the idea of the formation of a separate 
third-world identity common to all. Nor, beyond its commitment to peace and co-existence, was 
there any concerted attempt to develop a common economic or political philosophy distinct from 
capitalism and socialism, even if the general inclination of most parties in member countries 
was towards the forms of socialism developed during anti-colonial struggle, in which socialist 
ideas had been adapted to their own particular contexts. This was never defined, however, as a 
common position.
The complexity of the political situation in which the Bandung nations found themselves, caught 
in the midst of Cold War politics, and the extent to which that context determined their own posi-
tion, is not often acknowledged. After the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union and its ally 
China were widely regarded as a significant threat to other countries in Asia. At the same time, 
the 1947 Truman Doctrine, proclaiming US military and economic assistance for all countries 
to maintain their independence, was rapidly giving way to John Foster Dulles’ foreign policy of 
military alliances and aid in order to “roll back” communism. The leaders at Bandung recognised 
the way that the wind was blowing and wanted, wherever possible, to avoid being caught up in 
these processes and to assert their own independence. Notwithstanding the presence of Zhou 
Enlai and Ho Chi Minh (who seems to have been somewhat sidelined in the proceedings), the 
conference stressed the political and ideological independence of the new nations. The tone of 
the meeting was even predominantly anti-Soviet, and in discussions of contemporary colonialism, 
several delegates raised the question of Eastern Europe as a new form of colonialism, an issue 
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that Nehru promptly ruled out of bounds. However, the establishment of a neutral identity was 
complicated by the fact that several countries present were, for all practical purposes, already 
affiliated to the Eastern bloc. It is now often forgotten that China was a major participant at 
Bandung. Although often addressed to the Chinese delegation, all anti-Soviet feeling was ami-
cably ignored by Zhou Enlai, who successfully engaged on something of a charm offensive, and 
proved himself unexpectedly flexible on matters of principle such as human rights and peaceful 
co-existence. For the Chinese, the conference was seen as a means of assuaging Asian anxie-
ties about its perceived military threat, and of cementing alliances in the face of the US policy of 
containing communism in Asia. At the same time, as in the case of Yugoslavia, Bandung offered 
a means for China to strengthen alternative affiliations to its relationship to the Soviet Union 
– from which it was to split definitively six years later. Bandung was itself always part of Cold 
War games and strategies. 
Any new Third World identity at Bandung, therefore, was very much mediated by recent and ongoing 
wars in Asia. This encouraged the delegates to try to step out of the dynamics of the Cold War 
that was producing such conflicts into a free space of neutrality. In this context, the Soviet Union 
was regarded as the most threatening power. By the time of the Tricontinental Conference in 
Havana eleven years later, the situation had changed dramatically. At Havana, the Soviet Union 
was regarded as the major ally, and the US characterised as the global imperialist power that 
had to be resisted at all costs. Non-alignment had changed to alignment, and the political phi-
losophy of non-violence had moved to one of violence.
II. From Positive Action to Armed Struggle
The neutral status that Bandung, and later the Non-Aligned Movement, sought was hard to 
sustain in practice. In 1955, many countries remained under colonial rule, particularly in Southern 
Africa. In French North Africa, a one-year-old independence struggle was being waged with 
increasing fierceness in Algeria. In addition, in Cyprus, the EOKA struggle had also just been 
initiated. Bandung’s emphasis on the political positioning of the independent nations, defining 
themselves against the West but not identifying with the Eastern bloc, meant that the signatories 
implicitly hoped that the liberation of the still colonised countries would follow the same course 
that had already been established in India, Ghana, Zambia and elsewhere, namely through the 
use of non-violent methods, along with US support and without significant strategic intervention 
from the Soviet Union. In this scenario, recourse to armed struggle as in Kenya remained the 
exception rather than the rule. 
However, events after Bandung showed that moral force alone proved increasingly difficult to 
wield effectively. The Bandung signatories may have been able to sustain their non-alignment 
as independent nations – but this was not an option for others such as Lumumba in the Congo 
or for those engaged in anti-colonial struggles. The subsequent course of anti-colonial history 
was to involve a story where the freedom movements encountered intransigent resistance by 
the colonial powers, as a result of which liberation movements increasingly turned to armed 
struggle. By the end of the decade, the majority of outstanding colonies in Africa, such as Alge-
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ria, Zimbabwe and South Africa, were of the settler variety, where the colonial regime was very 
much harder to displace, or part of the Portuguese Empire (Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola 
and Mozambique), whose fascist government depended on its colonies both economically and 
ideologically. In this situation, where the colonial powers were either directly or indirectly sus-
tained by the Western powers of Britain, France, Portugal, and the USA, and where the major 
material support for such anti-colonial struggles came from the Eastern bloc of the Soviet Union 
and Communist China, it became more and more difficult to sustain the connection between 
independence and non-alignment. 
III. The Coalescence of Struggles across the Three Continents
With the shift to armed struggle, the differences between the anti-colonial movements and other 
resistance movements became less distinct. Gandhian non-alignment fell away, and almost all anti-
colonial organizations became overtly socialist in political identification and communist affiliated in 
terms of the sources of supplies brought in for their military campaigns. At the same time, the 
intensification of the US policy of containing communism by installing or supporting compliant 
dictatorships, particularly in Vietnam and Latin America, meant that the boundaries between 
anti-colonial and Cold War politics became increasingly blurred. By the same token, those resisting 
anti-colonial struggles were now able to do so in the name of resisting communism, a move al-
ready apparent in the British campaign in Malaya in the nineteen fifties, or in Britain’s treatment of 
Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana in 1953. This strategy was used most effectively by the South African 
government, who conflated the ANC and local communists (whether Communists or Trotskyites) 
with the perceived global designs of the Soviet Union. Thereafter apartheid was nicely sustained 
on an anti-communist ticket, with tacit US and British support. The identification of the anti-colonial 
struggles with Soviet communism was often as much an ideological strategy of the colonial powers 
as an accurate indication of political affiliation. One unanticipated result that it achieved was the coa-
lescence of the anti-colonial arena with the hitherto relatively independent movement of resistance 
to US neo-colonial forces in Asia and Latin America. 
Until the late nineteen fifties, it was Asia that had borne the brunt of the US policy of the contain-
ment of communism, with Africa secured by the maintenance of repressive colonial regimes 
such as those of Portugal and South Africa, or the now customary extrajudicial ‘decapitation’ 
of leaders perceived as threatening, such as Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. Latin America, 
most of which gained independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was effectively 
controlled by the US through its dominance of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and 
other organisations of Latin American solidarity, which were effectively designed to maintain its 
hegemony over the region which it had established after the Spanish-American War of 1898. 
Latin America only experienced anti-colonial struggle in arenas linked to the Caribbean: Belize, 
the Guianas, and the British and French Antilles. However, the triumph of Fidel Castro’s forces 
over the US-backed Batista regime in Cuba in 1959 dramatically changed this scenario. After the 
US unwisely cut off its ties with Cuba, imposed its economic blockade, and expelled Cuba from 
the OAS, effectively pushing the new Cuban government into dependency on the Soviet Union, 
larger global configurations developed. 
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The Cuban Revolution had a significant effect in that it brought Latin America for the first time 
into the same orbit of resistance as Asia and Africa. The Cubans identified themselves fully 
with other political movements against various US-supported autocratic neo-colonial regimes 
in Latin America, and Cuba rapidly became the figurehead for resistance across the continent. 
Elsewhere there was a growing awareness of the forces of neo-colonialism in post-colonial 
Africa after the murder of Lumumba by the CIA in 1961. (Eisenhower mistakenly saw him as a 
Congolese Castro).7 Nkrumah’s Neo-Colonialism, outlining Ghana’s experiences of dependence 
in independence, dated from 1965.8 Above all, however, it was the US intervention in Vietnam 
from 1964 onwards against the army of Ho Chi Minh, who had first declared Vietnamese inde-
pendence in 1945, which brought Vietnam together with Cuba, and allied their situation with 
anti-colonial fighters in Palestine, Portuguese Africa, South Africa, all of whose regimes were 
supported by the US. This produced a general consolidation of resistance to US imperialism 
across Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
IV. Cuba and Vietnam
The fulcrum of this shift of US policy towards colonised peoples was undoubtedly the increasing 
American military campaign in Vietnam. It is the history of Cuba, however, that shows the dy-
namics of how, largely as a response to circumstances, independent countries found it impossible 
to maintain a non-aligned stance. When the revolutionary forces moved into Havana on 1 January 
1959, their leader Fidel Castro was by no means a convinced communist. Initially, the new govern-
ment formed a broad coalition of anti-Batista forces. After Castro became President, he initiated a 
programme of nationalisation and land reform that was close in its principles to earlier nationalist 
programmes such as that of Cardenas in Mexico. It was the outraged American reaction to the new 
Cuban government’s policy of nationalising a number of US companies in Cuba, and to expelling the 
corrupt US mafiosi who had been in effect in control of much of the country’s gambling economy, 
together with the ideological influence of Che Guevara to whose ideas Castro became increasingly 
receptive, that led Castro to communism. When the US started to downgrade the Cuban sugar 
quota, only to abolish it altogether, Cuba, which at that time was a monocultural economy, turned 
to any nation that was prepared to step in with support: the major offer came from the Soviet Union. 
It was not long before the Cuban Missile Crisis identified Cuba with the Eastern bloc.
In the face of US aggression, particularly after the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961, Cuba drew 
strength from that alliance and encouraged its communist identification. However, its form of 
revolutionary politics was very different from the Stalinized bourgeois politics of the Soviet Union. In 
the early sixties, as a third-world country oppressed by US imperialism, Cuba began to identify its 
stance much more with those of the anti-colonial movements round the world, particularly that 
of Vietnam. Cuba was a country whose revolution had been developed not against the original 
coloniser, the Spaniards, but a second neo-colonial coloniser, the USA, which, after its victory in 
the Spanish-American War of 1898, had moved in to take surrogate control of the country. While 
Cuba was given nominal independence, its constitution was obliged to contain the notorious clause 
which gave the US the right to intervene in its domestic affairs. In addition, Cuba was required to 
lease the Guantánamo Bay naval base to the US in perpetuity. Increasingly, the island succumbed 
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to the pressure of US businesses in Cuba, so that US interests largely controlled its domestic 
regime. In this move from colonial to semi-colonial or neo-colonial status, Cuba’s situation 
was close to that of Vietnam, where the defeat of the French in 1954 had not been followed by 
independence, but by the enforced division of the country according to which the southern half 
was controlled by a US puppet government. The Vietnamese struggle against the neo-colonial 
regime of the US put it in a situation comparable to that of the Cuban struggle against US inter-
vention and then, when that failed, the US blockade. With a common enemy, Cuba and Vietnam 
found themselves as two brother Davids facing Goliath. 
Cuba and Vietnam were thus in a somewhat different position from countries such as Alge-
ria and Kenya that had struggled against a conventional colonial power. Their confrontation 
with US interests precipitated them into forming immediate alliances with the Soviet Union, 
together with those movements in Latin America struggling against corrupt and oligarchic 
regimes sustained by the US.
V. The Rise of US Imperialism
At the time of Bandung, there were effectively two analogous but separate spheres of subaltern 
struggle. One was in Africa and Asia, whose inhabitants fought against the old imperial powers of 
Britain, France, and Portugal, and the early manifestations of the communist containment policy 
of the US; the other in Latin America, where the Left had been long opposed to the domination 
of the US and the regimes it supported. 
Global perceptions of the US changed with extraordinary speed. In 1945, the Americans had been 
the liberators, widely perceived as bringing freedom across the world. At Bandung, the Soviet Union 
had been the villain. Eleven years later, at Havana, it was the US. How did the US lose its advantage 
so fast? In a few years, it changed from being the champion of democracy, self-determination and 
decolonisation, to a state so driven by an obsession to contain communism that it would apparently 
prop up or institute any regime, however corrupt, exploitative and dictatorial, so long as it was 
opposed to socialism. This represented a complete reconfiguration of the US position since 1945. 
With its decisive role in the liberation of Europe, the US under Roosevelt had operated a policy, 
highly awkward for Britain and France, whereby the same principles of liberation for Europe 
were stated to apply equally to the colonies. At that time, therefore, the US had presented itself 
as the champion of anti-colonialism. However, with the onset of the Cold War and changes in 
its own domestic regime, the priority swung to the defence of the West against communism. 
Since many anti-colonial movements were oriented towards the long-standing anti-colonial 
and anti-imperial position of communism, whose record had been outstanding in this regard, 
the US now found itself opposed to many of the liberation movements, and more inclined to 
prop up conservative regimes at any cost so long as they were anti-communist. For the US the 
defence of freedom has always been a malleable concept. As the nineteen fifties progressed, it 
was directed not towards the establishment of national autonomy of people living under colonial 
regimes, but the defence of the ‘free world’ against communism, at whatever cost. This brought 
an assumption that peoples of the Third World had to be defended against communism, even 
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when they had themselves elected a communist government as in Chile. As a result, defending 
‘freedom’ took on the paternalistic role of the US knowing what such countries really wanted 
better than the people themselves – a classic colonial attitude. 
These convictions led the US to support anti-communist forces in Vietnam, Korea, colonial 
autocracies such as the apartheid government in South Africa, as well as a range of neo-colonial 
regimes in Latin America. Thus in Latin America, in Guatemala, the leftist President Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzmán was overthrown with US help in 1954 after he had nationalised the US-owned 
United Fruit Company; in Brazil, President João Goulart was overthrown by a military coup in 
January 1964 and his successor initiated a campaign of persecution of ‘communists’; in Bolivia, 
the government of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was overthrown in November 
1964 by the military, with US support. In Asia, in 1955 the US organised the deposition of Bao Dai, 
South Vietnamese head of state, and his replacement by the dictator Ngo Dinh Diem, who was 
himself then disposed of in a military coup in 1963, which heralded direct US military interven-
tion. In the Middle East, in 1956 US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew US promised 
financial aid to Egypt for the building of the Aswan Dam on account of his distrust of Nasser’s 
policies of Arab socialism. Nasser responded by nationalising the Suez Canal, and turned to the 
Russians for assistance. Egypt soon found itself being invaded by Israel, followed by Britain and 
France. When the British and French were forced to withdraw, Nasser immediately achieved 
huge international prestige amongst Third World countries throughout the world. The identifica-
tion of Third World independence, anti-colonial struggle, and Soviet Union aid, against the axis 
of the US, Britain, France and Israel was firmly set thereafter. 
The two struggles, which we might term the anticolonial and the anti-imperial, therefore de-
veloped under separate, if interrelated, dynamics. However, the American attempt to contain 
communism in South East Asia, its blockade of Cuba and insistence on controlling the politics of 
Latin America, together with its support of Israel and South Africa, which actively supported the 
Salazar regime in neighbouring Angola and Mozambique, meant that after 1955 the remaining 
anti-colonial struggles merged with resistance to US imperialism. All these different move-
ments were formally brought together at the Havana Tricontinental Conference in 1966.
VI. The Tricontinental
The articulation of the anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements was consolidated at the first 
Conference of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, held 
in Havana from 3 to 16 January 1966. As has been suggested, the work of the Tricontinental has 
tended to be overshadowed by the earlier Bandung Conference of 1955, which has, no doubt for 
ideological reasons, acquired greater symbolic capital in the West. The Tricontinental, however, 
represented a decisive further development. In the first place, it brought together all three conti-
nents of the South, uniting them and their interests in a common perspective and position vis-à-vis 
the overdeveloped world. In the second place, while those engaged in anti-colonial struggles had 
established alliances across colonial-national boundaries, and developed ideological formations 
such as pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism to counter the fragmentations of colonial rule, and while 
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the Comintern of the Third International Congresses of the nineteen twenties had developed an 
international organisation to promote resistance to colonial rule, there had never been an inter-
national organisation dedicated to the resistance of colonialism and imperialism throughout the 
world based in and organised from the Third World itself. The Tricontinental brought together the 
anticolonial struggles of Africa and Asia with the radical movements of Latin America, and marked 
the initiation of a global alliance of the three continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America against impe-
rialism. This conjunction was mediated at that time by the worldwide fight against imperialism repre-
sented by the American intervention in Vietnam, where an anti-colonial liberation struggle against the 
French had itself been superseded by and merged into an anti-imperial war against the US. 
While Latin America had, for the most part, fought its anti-colonial battles in the nineteenth century, 
by the same token it was first to encounter the postcolonial reality of neo-colonialism, of the impe-
rialism by indirect rule that began with the Monroe Doctrine. It was the Tricontinental which brought 
together not only the three continents of the South, but also the two different time-schemes of the 
postcolonial world: the newly liberated and the about-to-be-liberated, with the long-time liberated 
nations which were struggling for the second liberation of establishing true national sovereignty 
and autonomy. The Tricontinental focused exclusively on current anti-colonial and anti-imperial 
struggles across the world, initiated an overall framework for globalised struggle, and stood for the 
positive form of globalisation of which Fidel Castro had more recently spoken. This involved a real 
“proletarian internationalism”, a globalisation of solidarity between the human family, working for 
“a world that is really for all, without hunger or poverty, without oppression or exploitation, without 
humiliations or contempt, without injustice or inequalities, where everyone might live in full moral 
and material dignity, in true liberty”.9 In affirming these values, the Tricontinental positioned itself 
firmly against those forces in the world that sought to impose forms of domination and exploitation 
on the poorer peoples of the earth. 
The particular sentiments of the 1966 Tricontinental, and its commitment to wars of liberation, were 
developed in the context of the world of Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon and of Ho Chi Minh. Although the 
mode of violent revolution as the mode of liberation necessary for that era has passed with them, 
the condition of global imperialism of which Che spoke in his famous ‘Message to the Tricontinental’ 
of April 1967 seems today more contemporary than ever. Che wrote: “Everything seems to indicate 
that peace … is again in danger of being broken by some irreversible and unacceptable step taken 
by the United States.”10 In fact, the US in the first years of the twenty-first century seems more and 
more to be repeating the role which it played in the nineteen sixties. While the widespread hostility 
to the US in the nineteen sixties seemed in recent years to have become somewhat dated, in the 
twenty first century, as the US has once again re-asserted its role as global imperial superpower, 
the politics of the Tricontinental have become more relevant than ever. It is true that the primacy 
of armed struggle encapsulated in Che’s dramatic “Message to the Continental” was, in retrospect, 
predicated on a global balance of power that no longer exists. This suggests, however, that there 
may be all the more point in redeveloping the earlier alternative, subaltern forms of resistance 
against colonialism that have been the focus of much work in the postcolonial field. The Marxist 
argument that postcolonialism has been mistaken in its emphasis on colonialism when what it is 
dealing with is simply one part of the wider process of capitalist modernity seems now less relevant 
when the form of that capitalist modernity has become encapsulated in one imperial power.11
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In 1967, Che Guevara remarked: “In focusing on the destruction of imperialism, it is necessary 
to identify its head, which is none other than the United States of North America.”12 Today, in the 
United States itself, a different argument has been proposed, even on the left. In their recent 
book, Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri claim that: “The United States does not, and in-
deed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over.”13 
The book has become a bestseller in the US. No doubt it has been comforting for people there 
to believe that their government has only been defending the interests of the whole world, not 
those of the US alone. Hardt and Negri would never have made that claim, however, if they had 
lived in Cuba. History may be over for Fukayama, imperialism for Hardt and Negri, but if one 
stands in Cuba looking towards the prisoners from Afghanistan and other countries at the US 
Guantánamo naval base, held without reference to international law or the Geneva Conventions 
governing the treatment of prisoners of war, if one looks towards the skies in Baghdad, if one 
stands in Kabul or in Palestine, one will see the continuing history of the same imperialism 
against which Che fought being played out before one’s eyes. In fact, today, Guevara’s focus on 
the US as the world superpower insisting on the irreversible dominance of its point of view, on 
a concept of freedom that seems to mean that the world should be free, just so long as it thinks 
exactly like the US, seems more prescient than ever. That is why it is now time for us to return, 
with Che, to the Tricontinental.
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